On the Theoretical Foundations for Regulating Financial Markets by Pistor, Katharina
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2012 
On the Theoretical Foundations for Regulating Financial Markets 
Katharina Pistor 
Columbia Law School, kpisto@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katharina Pistor, On the Theoretical Foundations for Regulating Financial Markets, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL 
PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 12-304 (2012). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2436 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2113675
Columbia Law School 
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group 
 
 
Paper Number 12-304 
 
 
 
 
On the Theoretical Foundations  
for Regulating Financial Markets 
 
Katharina Pistor  
Columbia Law School  
 
 
 
 
June 28, 2012 
 
 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2113675
 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the Theoretical Foundations for Regulating Financial Markets1 
 
 
 
Katharina Pistor2 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
How we think about financial markets determines how we regulate them. Since the 1970s 
modern finance theory has shaped how we think about and regulate financial markets. It 
is based on the notion that markets are or can be made (more) efficient. Financial markets 
have been deregulated when they were thought to achieve efficient outcomes on their 
own; and regulation was designed to lend crutches to them when it appeared that they 
needed support. While modern finance theory has suffered some setbacks in the 
aftermath of the global crisis, defenders hold that improving market efficiency should 
still be the overriding concern for regulation. This essay raises the question whether this 
is indeed the case. What if other factors besides information costs affect the vulnerability 
of markets to crises? Two factors have been identified in the literature: Imperfect 
Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraint. This essay introduces the relevant theories that 
focus on these factors and discusses their regulatory implications. 
                                                        
1
 I am grateful to Merritt Fox, Roman Frydman, Ron Gilson, Jeffrey Gordon, Edward Green, Rachel 
Harvey, Robert Jackson, Kate Judge, Perry Mehrling, Charles Sabel, and Zohar Goshen for comments on 
an earlier version of this paper. All remaining and newly accrued errors are mine. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the global crisis long-held views about financial markets have 
come under pressure. Questions have been raised whether financial markets are indeed 
efficient and whether the deregulation of financial markets that was justified by the 
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (EMH) has caused more harm than good.3 Most of 
the current critiques of EMH center around three issues: whether market actors are indeed 
rational, autonomous actors or instead beset by herd behavior;4  whether markets are 
                                                        
3
 For an insightful review of these debates in different countries and how post-crisis debates relate to pre-
crisis ones, see JULIE FROUD et al., Stories and Interests in Finance: Agendas of Governance before and 
after the Financial Crisis, 25 Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and 
Institutions 35-39 (2012).  
4
 This critique has been articulated by the literature on behavioral finance. See, for example, GEORGE A. 
AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it 
Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton University Press. 2009). 
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fundamentally or “informationally” efficient5 ; and whether markets or regulators are 
better able to make allocative decisions.6  
This debate can be understood only within the dominant framework employed for 
conceptualizing financial markets. It assumes that financial markets are no different from 
the market for ordinary tradable goods and that, therefore, the general equilibrium models 
that have been developed for tradable goods apply to finance just as well. A very 
different perspective is offered by theories that seek to explain the operation of real world 
financial systems and their empirically manifested trend towards instability. The two 
critical ingredients that have been identified by these alternative theories are Imperfect 
Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraint.7  
The insight that knowledge is imperfect can be traced back to the work of Knight,8 
Keynes9 and Minsky.10 Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg have recently extended it 
to their theory of “Imperfect Knowledge Economics” (IKE). 11  They share with 
                                                        
5
 RONALD GILSON & REINIER KRAAKMAN, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Virginia Law Review 
549 (1984) at 613. 
6
 There is broad consensus among lawyers and economists that markets are superior. For the basic 
theoretical argument see Louis De Alessi, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay 
in Economic Theory, 73 American Economic Review 64-81 (1983). On public vs. private entities, see 
Aidan R. Vining & Anthony E. Boardman, Ownership versus competition: Efficiency in public enterprise, 
73 Public Choice 205-239 (1992).  
7
 The concept of Illiquidity and Imperfect Knowledge Constraints are derived from the literature. I have 
taken the liberty to coin them in this fashion and capitalize them. 
8
 FRANK H. KNIGHT, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit  (Houghton Mifflin. 1921).  
9
 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Harcourt, Inc. 1964 
(1936)) at 248, explaining that investing in the future is a key aspect of capitalist economies; yet 
information about the past is insufficient to predict the future.  
10
 Building on Keynes’s work, Minsky argues that the inability to predict the future in combination with 
price competition leads actors in financial markets to adopt financing strategies that destabilize the system 
over time. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (Yale University Press. 1986) at 230. 
11
 ROMAN FRYDMAN & MICHAEL D. GOLDBERG, Imperfect Knowledge Economics (Princeton University 
Press. 2007); see also their most recent book, which is accessible to a broader audience, in which they 
restate the IKE theory and suggest some regulatory implications. ROMAN FRYDMAN & MICHAEL D. 
GOLDBERG, Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State (Princeton 
University Press. 2011). It should be noted that for now they limit their theory to macroeconomics. 
However, they do not preclude the possibility that the theory could be extended into a general theory of 
financial economics. See ibid at 256. 
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proponents of EMH the notion that fundamentals drive asset prices. Yet, according to 
IKE, markets do not trend towards equilibrium outcomes, as posited by EMH and its 
cousin, the Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH). Instead, imperfect knowledge is 
responsible for almost the opposite result, namely extreme asset price swings. The reason 
is that prices do not track an assumed intrinsic value; rather, they reflect the struggle of 
market participants to determine asset value in light of a constantly changing 
environment. The reversal of asset prices can be extremely costly for the real economy, 
as price adjustments can trigger economy-wide deleveraging, which is associated with 
economic recession and, in the worst-case scenario, depression. This, in the eyes of 
Frydman and Goldberg, makes the case for government intervention to prevent extreme 
asset price swings. In the world of IKE, imperfect knowledge is an existential factor that 
cannot be altered and will lead to an endogenous process of extreme asset prices swings 
as market participants continue to pursue existing strategies until they observe many 
others changing strategy.  Financial regulation is therefore not limited to information 
enhancement, but takes a more proactive stand to avoid financial crises and economic 
hardship. 
The Liquidity Constraint has been articulated by Keynes and Minsky and is at the 
heart of Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis”.12 It is closely intertwined with the 
Imperfect Knowledge Constraint. Because we have imperfect knowledge about the 
future, we employ financing strategies that are informed by current knowledge. However, 
                                                        
12
 For a review of Minsky’s contribution to finance theory, see PERRY MEHRLING, The Vision of Hyman 
Minsky, 39 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations 129-158 (1999). See also Mehrling’s analysis 
of the failure of Long Term Capital Management in light of Minsky’s theory. PERRY MEHRLING, Minsky 
and Modern Finance: The Case of Long Term Capital Management, Winter 2000 Journal of Portfolio 
Management 81-89 (2000). Mehrling himself extends Minsky’s analysis to contemporary financial markets 
in PERRY MEHRLING, The New Lombard Street: How the Fed Became the Dealer of Last Resort (Princeton 
University Press. 2011), hereinafter Mehrling (2011a). 
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extrapolation from the present to the future, which is unknowable, may be off the mark.  
This causes market participants to radically alter their strategy when the future arrives. 
We may well have overestimated the ability to pay bills from earned income as they 
become due, or the willingness of others to refinance debt should obligations exceed 
current revenue. This follows from the principle of Imperfect Knowledge. When doubts 
about the ability of intermediaries to pay their bills or to refinance their debt spread, the 
Liquidity Constraint comes into its own. Refinancing current and financing future 
positions will be cut back, resulting in a downward price adjustment and potential 
deleveraging or fire sale of assets. This follows from the simple fact that, in the words of 
Keynes, “there is no such thing as liquidity for the community as a whole”.13  
The end result of this process can be a financial, or worse, an economic crisis. 
Proponents of both Imperfect Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraint theories therefore 
postulate that instability of financial markets is an endogenously driven process. 14 
However, there are also important differences between the two approaches. According to 
Minsky, economic systems are a matter of social choices and institutional arrangements 
that may be more or less conducive to instability. In contrast, Frydman and Goldberg 
abstract from institutions as well as from liquidity and focus on self-correcting asset price 
swings as the trigger of crises, and imperfect knowledge as their root cause.  
Perry Mehrling builds on Minsky’s work and places liquidity at the center of his 
analysis. Liquidity is elastic, with its relative elasticity being determined by the 
                                                        
13
 Keynes, supra note 9 at 155. 
14
 See also JEAN TIROLE, Liquidity and All its Friends, 49 Journal of Economic Literature 287-325 (2011) 
at 320, suggesting that “when everyone engages in maturity transformation, authorities have little choice 
but facilitating refinancing, and so refusing to adopt a risky balance sheet lowers the return on equity.” It 
follows that there will be multiple equilibria and that contrary to Capital Asset Pricing Models (discussed 
infra), “it is in the interest of each bank to be illiquid.” 
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management of the overall (public and private) credit supply.15 The financial system is 
depicted as a credit system. Every unit in the economy is a bank, each with its own 
balance sheet comprising assets and liabilities. Assets held on the balance sheet of one 
unit have their mirror image in the liabilities of another. Each seeks to balance its books. 
When liabilities exceed assets, a unit seeks to balance assets and liabilities by deferring 
payments to its creditors, by seeking short-term financing to fill the gap, or by selling 
assets to generate cash. If all fail, it will default, forcing its creditors to make up for the 
difference in order to balance their own books. This in turn pushes the chain of 
unmatched liabilities from creditor to creditor and up the ladder of the financial system to 
whoever is willing or capable to step in as lender of last resort (LLR). Historically, this 
role has been played at times by private agents, such as Mr. J.P. Morgan in the financial 
crisis of 1907,16 but nowadays it is typically filled by the central bank – in the US, the 
Federal Reserve (the Fed).  
An important motive for financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage from this 
perspective is the search by market actors for strategies to increase the elasticity of the 
Liquidity Constraint each of them faces. The task of those overseeing this system – the 
LLR and its agents – is to balance the elasticity of the liquidity of the system as a whole 
with a view on promoting growth, while avoiding high levels of volatility and 
destabilization. 
Modern finance theory does not ignore imperfect knowledge or liquidity issues, but 
relegates them to subordinate roles. The Imperfect Knowledge Constraint is typically 
                                                        
15
 This is a clear departure from the monetarists who focus entirely on the money supply. See Mehrling, 
supra note 12 at 58, but also Minsky (1986), supra note 10 at 182. 
16
 ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect 
Storm (John Wiley & Sons. 2007). 
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reinterpreted as an information problem;17 and the Liquidity Constraint boiled down to a 
moral hazard issue, as when financial intermediaries are seeking a bailout. 18  If, in 
contrast, the Imperfect Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraints are put at center stage, 
information costs are demoted to a matter of secondary importance. The Imperfect 
Knowledge Constraint tells us that no matter how much information is revealed ex ante, 
information about the past or present does not equal knowledge about the future. It 
follows that the focus on information in financial market regulation is insufficient. It may 
even be counter-productive because it creates the appearance that better information can 
convert the fundamental problem of uncertainty into a probability calculation, even 
though every probability calculation uses assumptions based on what we can know today, 
which may turn out to be wrong tomorrow.19 Worse, the belief that better information can 
ultimately drive markets towards efficiency may prevent legislatures and regulators from 
pursuing alternative, and potentially superior, strategies for governing financial markets. 
The theories that invoke the Liquidity Constraint go a step further still. They suggest 
that neither information shortage, nor imperfect knowledge can explain the scale of 
financial crises we observe in the real world. Absent the Liquidity Constraint, there is no 
reason why assets can no longer be sold when new information is revealed and 
knowledge upgraded to the present. The root cause of financial crisis is that at that time 
there are few takers of assets, as most market participants will strive to obtain cash to pay 
                                                        
17
 See infra the discussion under II.A. 
18
 The Liquidity Constraint can also be portrayed as an information problem. See Tirole, supra note 14 at 
298, suggesting that one of the reasons for the breakdown of market liquidity, i.e. the ability to sell assets 
against cash, is information asymmetry. Note, however, that he does not limit the analysis to this point and 
instead suggests that endogenous market processes can result in liquidity breakdowns. See ibid note 16. 
Moreover, he concludes his analysis by pointing out that recognition of the Liquidity Constraint has 
regulatory implications that are not fully understood and that advancements require, among others, a 
convergence of micro and macroeconomics. See Tirole supra note 14 at 323.  
19
 This is essentially why the Value at Risk model that was widely followed by investors prior to the crisis 
went spectacularly wrong. See Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 244. 
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off their own liabilities as they become due.20 They will therefore seek to sell assets and 
if all do the same at the same time can trigger a fire sale of assets that drives down prices 
across the economy. 
In short, theory matters for how we regulate, because it determines how we think 
about markets and how we define the purpose of regulation. If there is more than one 
theory that helps us understand how financial markets operate and what regulation might 
accomplish, it is useful to consider their respective merits. To be sure, disputes over 
regulatory theories take a long time to resolve – often too long for legislatures or 
regulators who need to respond to market developments and crises immediately. 
However, even without a conclusive resolution of the theoretical debates, a better 
understanding of different theories and their regulatory implications might be helpful. 
Different theories may come to similar conclusions on specific issues, thereby lending 
greater support to a particular regulatory intervention. Moreover, having a menu of 
options may be superior to a fixed course, especially if the last time the fixed course was 
on offer emergency care was required afterwards – whether or not we can establish 
causality between the two events. Last, but not least, in a world of so many unknowns, 
experimentation with multiple regulatory strategies may result in better outcomes than 
placing all bets on one card.21 
 
II. The Theoretical Foundations of Finance 
 
                                                        
20
 Keynes suggests that a collapse of equity prices “may have been due to the weakening either of 
speculative confidence or of the state of credit”, where the “state of credit” is defined as “the confidence of 
the lending institutions towards those who seek to borrow from them.” Keynes, supra note 9 at 158. 
21
 On this point, see ROBERTA ROMANO, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Banking 
Institutions: Rethinking the Basel Architecture, unpublished MS on file with author (2011) at 66. 
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This part of the essay introduces different theories of finance and their core features. 
We begin with the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (EMH), which has been the 
backbone of modern financial theories and regulatory approaches. We then turn to 
theories that use the Imperfect Knowledge and Liquidity Constraints respectively to 
explain the operation of financial markets. A comparison  of the three theories with the 
greatest policy relevance today will conclude the section. 
 
A. Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
 
EMH holds that in a world without transaction and information costs markets will 
allocate capital to the most efficient use. Prices will incorporate all relevant information 
and the price mechanism will therefore ensure an efficient outcome.22 An important step 
in the development of EMH was an empirical observation, the famous random walk of 
stock prices. The fact that markets did not follow a pattern that could be predicted from 
price movements in the past suggested that financial markets themselves could be 
analyzed as competitive markets with equilibrium outcomes. After all, independence of 
past and present price and the implied absence of arbitrage opportunities suggested stable 
equilibria.23 This “no arbitrage” paradigm, most famously stated by Samuelson in 1965,24 
                                                        
22
 Efficiency in this context is typically defined as Pareto efficiency, meaning that no further transaction 
will make anyone better off without making others worse off. However, given that markets in the real 
world do not necessarily resemble fully Pareto efficient markets, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has become the 
preferred benchmark among legal academics. It requires only a net social benefit but assumes that the 
actual costs of different transactions and their implications can be assessed with reasonable accuracy. In 
combination with the notion that markets may only be relatively efficient, this leaves ample room for 
judgment calls and ideational debates when assessing the pros and cons of different regulatory strategies.  
23
 See See PERRY MEHRLING, Financial Economics, unpublished MS on file with author (2011) at 6. 
Hereinafter Merhling (2011b). 
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became the foundation for the new fundamental theory of asset pricing. It posited the 
existence of a positive linear pricing rule, implying that assets that were not yet widely 
traded could be priced by reference to assets that were.25 This gave rise to financial 
engineering and the development of sophisticated financial instruments, including over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives that were priced and sold even in the absence of an already 
existing market.26   
EMH and the theorem of “no arbitrage in efficient markets” did not remain without 
doubters. Samuelson himself disclosed in his original paper that he had hesitated to 
publish the theorem for almost ten years. When he did eventually publish it he warned 
against drawing far-reaching normative implications. In his words, the efficiency theorem  
does not prove that actual competitive  markets work well. It does not say that 
speculation is a good thing or that randomness of price changes would be a good 
thing. It does not prove that anyone who makes money in speculation is ipso facto 
deserving of the gain or even that he has accomplished something good for 
society or for himself. All or none of these may by true, but that would require a 
different investigation.27 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
24
 See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 Industrial 
Management Review 41-49 (1965) at 44: “… there is no way of making an expected profit by extrapolating 
past changes in the future price, by chart or any other esoteric devices of magic or mathematics. The market 
quotation (…) already contains in itself all that can be known about the future and in that sense has 
discounted future contingencies as much as is humanly possible (or inhumanly possible within the axiom of 
the model).” 
25
 See Mehrling (2011a), supra note 12 at 7. See also DONALD MACKENZIE, An Engine, Not a Camera: 
How Financial Models Shape Markets (The MIT Press. 2006) at 139/140, suggesting that the no arbitrage 
principle was further developed by Cox and Ross into a “general, elegant account in which option prices 
were determined by the absence of arbitrage opportunities. (…) For Ross, models of stock prices and 
option theory were not separate endeavors. (…) Assets that were substitutes for each other – stocks with the 
same sensitivity to underlying risk factors; and option and its replicating portfolio – had to have the same 
price, for otherwise there was an arbitrage opportunity.” 
26
 See Mehrling, supra note 12 at 7. Note that OTC derivatives are customized and therefore lack the 
standard features otherwise presumed to be critical for the development of a deep and liquid market in 
financial instruments. The rise of the OTC derivatives markets is therefore closely associated with the 
widely shared belief that the price of these papers can be inferred from other assets. For a powerful 
argument for how finance theory has shaped the way financial markets operate, see MacKenzie, supra note 
25, invoking the concept of performativity to suggest that markets came to resemble the models that were 
used to explain them. Specifically on the random walk theory and the EMH, see ibid at pp. 57. 
27
 Samuelson, supra note 24 at 48. 
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These warnings were to little avail. Whether he had intended to or not, Samuelson 
had transformed an empirical observation into a general theorem, the Rational 
Expectation Hypothesis (REH). The end result was a “normative theory” of asset 
markets, according to which, in the words of Frydman and Goldberg, 
barring informational asymmetries and other market failures, markets populated 
by rational individuals are stable, in the sense that they set prices to fluctuate 
randomly around intrinsic value.28 (emphasis added) 
 
 
Legal academics, judges and regulators quickly absorbed this theory, which has come 
to deeply inform financial market regulation in the US and elsewhere.29 In a seminal 
paper published in 1984, Professors Gilson and Kraakman explained the critical role law 
and legal institutions play in enhancing market efficiency.30 The SEC used EMH as a 
reference point for developing its integrated disclosure strategies for securities markets.31 
Last, but not least, the US Supreme Court embraced EMH in 1988 in its “Fraud on the 
Market Theory”: 
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and 
developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the 
available material information regarding the company and its business. (…) 
Misleading statements will therefore (…) defraud purchasers of stock even if the 
purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements. (…) The causal connection 
between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case 
is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.32 
 
                                                        
28
 Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 94. 
29
 The primary transmission channel to other parts of the world has been the standardization of financial 
regulation on ‘best practice’ models as exemplified by the US. See KATHARINA PISTOR, The 
Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 
101-134 (2002).  
30
 See Gilson and Kraakman (1984) supra note 5 at 549-50, suggesting that even at the time of their writing, 
EMH already informed academic literatures, had made inroads into legal textbooks and was structuring 
debates about future securities regulation. 
31
 For details, see PAOLO CIOPPA, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis Revisted: Implications of the 
Economic Model for the United States Regulator, 5 Global Jurist Advances Article 3 (2005).  
32
 BASIC INC. v. LEVINSON, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) at 255; Note that the Supreme Court insists that it is 
not assessing the validity of the theory, only whether lower courts were correct in invoking it.  
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In short, investors could rely on prices as the carrier of all relevant information. They 
were therefore able to charge directors who had failed to disclose what appeared to be 
valuable information with fraudulent conduct, even when the investors were unable to 
show that they had taken note of and acted upon any specific piece of information, such 
as an oral or written statement, but instead had relied on the market price.33  
EMH has survived crises and crashes, the possibility of which it rules out 
categorically. After all, efficient markets are supposed to be stable; they trend towards 
equilibrium, not disequilibrium. Crises therefore have to be attributed to exogenous 
effects, i.e. to events outside the financial system, which are typically characterized as 
shocks to the system rather than evidence of flaws in the theory used to describe and 
analyze it. 34  Alternatively, the causes for a crisis must be found in information 
inefficiency, such information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders.35 
One of the most ominous aspects of EMH has been the notion of “intrinsic value”.  
Judges have grown increasingly wary of what that might be and how it should be 
determined.36 Some of this was already apparent in the dissenting opinion by Justice 
White in the Supreme Court case that was decided in 1988: 
At the bottom of the Court's conclusion that the fraud-on-the-market theory 
sustains a presumption of reliance is the assumption that individuals rely "on the 
integrity of the market price" when buying or selling stock in "impersonal, well-
developed market[s] for securities." (….) it is this aspect of the fraud-on-the-
                                                        
33
 Reliance is a critical component in proving causality between misleading facts and harm. Effectively, 
EMH paved the way for securities class action suits in cases where market prices changed considerably 
after the disclosure of sensitive facts. 
34
 The 1987 stock market crash was thus attributed to electronic trading patterns; financial crises in 
emerging markets to bad institutions and regulatory ineptitude; the dot com crash to a few ‘bad apples’; and 
the subprime mortgage crisis to government policies aimed at increasing home ownership.  
35
 Foundational for this argument see Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with 
Imperfect Information, 71 American Economic Review 393-410 (1981). 
36
 See PAUL A. FERRILLO et al., The less than efficient Capital Market Hypothesis: Requiring more Proof, 
St. John's Law Review 78 (2004), suggesting the courts are asking for more proof than the original 
formulation of the fraud on the market theory, though ambiguous, might have suggested.  
 13
market hypothesis which most mystifies me. (…) [I]t implicitly suggests that 
stocks have some "true value" that is measurable by a standard other than their 
market price. While the scholastics of medieval times professed a means to make 
such a valuation of a commodity's "worth," I doubt that the federal courts of our 
day are similarly equipped.37 
 
For most advocates of EMH, its power derives from scientific truths.38 They would 
therefore reject scholasticism as unscientific. Yet, the duality of intrinsic and market 
value is built into the theory and is not an invention of judges or scholastics. EMH 
postulates that market prices reflect what the equilibrium outcome would be in a world 
consistent with the basic assumptions of the Rational Expectation Hypothesis.39 Eugene 
Fama, the originator of the random walk theory, himself conceded that in competitive 
markets there is sufficient disagreement to make the determination of the intrinsic value 
elusive. 40  Nonetheless, he posited that, in accordance with the Rational Expectation 
Hypothesis, prices should be assumed to fluctuate around intrinsic value.41  
The wide support of EMH in legal quarters may strike some as surprising. In its 
strongest form EMH makes law superfluous and should therefore drive lawyers and 
academics in the fields of corporate or securities law out of business or law schools. After 
all, if the market prices all relevant information, then all investors have to do is track that 
price. Any further protection is either useless or distorts the operation of the market. 
However, this conclusion follows only if markets have already achieved efficiency. If, in 
contrast, markets are not quite efficient but could be engineered to become more so, then 
there is a central role for law and lawyers. Specifically, law can help explain why markets 
                                                        
37
 Supra note 32 at 255. Emphasis added. 
38
 See Gilson and Kraakman (1984), supra note 30 at 549, who begin their elaboration with a long review 
of the overwhelming empirical evidence that financial markets suggest efficient outcomes.  
39
 Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 65. 
40
 See EUGENE FAMA, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 Journal of 
Finance 383-417 (1970) at 65. See also Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 93, quoting him.  
41
 Frydman and Goldberg, supra note 11 at 94. 
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may appear as if they were efficient, even though real world experience teaches us that 
transaction and information costs stand in the way of full efficiency. That is the 
contribution Gilson and Kraakman made in their 1984 piece in which they argued that 
specific institutional mechanisms contribute to the relative efficiency of markets. 42 
Moreover, if it turns out that markets don’t always act efficiently, lawyers can pave the 
way for making them more efficient.43 Once legal scholars had demonstrated that markets 
need crutches to become efficient and had identified a series of useful support 
mechanisms, the field of law was open for designing regulation, analyzing regulatory 
failures, and suggesting regulatory reforms – all in view of making markets efficient.  
The main argument in support of EMH even after the global crisis is that markets are 
not born efficient, but that they can be made relatively efficient by institutional and legal 
crutches. 44  How this altered concept of efficiency squares with the original EMH 
assumption that markets are efficient and therefore stable remains unexplained. If 
markets are only informationally efficient do they tilt towards equilibrium or fragility? Is 
this outcome socially desirable, and if so, why? Recall Samuelson’s warning that the 
proof of the theorem of market efficiency had nothing to say about its normative 
desirability. Presumably he would have been even more skeptical about the notion that 
relatively efficient markets are social welfare enhancing. 
                                                        
42
 They distinguish typologies of trading based on the level and source of information available to them. 
They also suggest that different mechanisms operate in different markets to make them efficient. For 
details, see Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 30 at esp. Figure One at 590. 
43
 See the discussion of policy implication in RONALD J. GILSON and REINIER KRAAKMAN, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 Journal of Corporation Law 
715-742 (2003) at 738. 
44
 Critically, however, on over-reliance of regulation to enhance market efficiency, Jonathan R. Macey, The 
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The standard answer to these questions by adherence of the EMH is that regulators 
will be no better and arguably worse at allocating resources than markets. That, of course, 
assumes that there are only two ways of governing financial markets: enhancing 
efficiency through institutional design or taking over decision making from market actors 
in a move akin to central planning associated with the socialist system, now in demise. In 
contrast, the theories discussed below suggest that there is room, indeed a need, for 
alternative institutional and regulatory approaches, and that it may be time to move 
beyond the simple state vs. market dichotomy in the debate about financial regulation. 
B. Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) 
 
Imperfect Knowledge Economics uses a very different point of departure than EMH, 
namely that markets are inherently instable. “Instability is an inherent feature of capitalist 
economies, perhaps nowhere more markedly so than in modern financial markets”.45 
Long swings in asset prices, which frequently lead to “painful shifts in consumption and 
investment patterns”,46 are manifestations of this instability. The major objective of IKE 
therefore is to explain observable swings in asset prices.  
IKE also postulates that market participants are aware of the fact that financial 
systems are inherently instable and that knowledge is imperfect.47 This is why, contrary 
to modern finance theory, market actors do not operate as robots following a single 
strategy to the end irrespective of any headwinds or other obstacles. Instead, rational 
individuals devise strategies to deal with imperfect knowledge on a day-to-day, minute-
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to-minute basis as they adjust their trading and investment strategies. These strategies lie 
at the heart of empirically observable long-term swings in asset prices, which can wreak 
havoc on financial and economic systems if allowed to swing excessively. In light of 
these realities, the attempt by financial economics to capture complex economic systems 
with mechanical, predetermined and fully specified models – namely EMH and REH – is 
deemed futile.48 
The starting point of this analysis is a rather conventional definition of what financial 
markets do. They “provide assessments of the relative prospect of companies’ assets”; 
“set prices” to reflect “expected return on past investments” as well as “new investments 
for which new capital is sought”; and “allocate capital based on these price signals”.49 
Most EMH proponents would agree with this definition. Where IKE departs from EMH 
is in its emphasis on two features of contemporary markets: “nonroutine change” and 
“imperfect knowledge”.  
In modern economies, individuals and companies engage in innovative activities, 
discovering new ways to use existing physical and human capital, and new 
technologies. The institutional and broader social context within which this 
entrepreneurial activity takes place also changes in novel ways. And innovation 
itself influences the future returns from economic activity in ways that no one can 
fully foresee.50 
 
Imperfect knowledge both follows from and explains nonroutine change. Because 
economic change is nonroutine, investment decisions are also “inherently nonroutine”.51 
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Nonetheless, individuals invest in the expectation of future returns, which makes 
corrections inevitable at some point in the future when knowledge is enhanced. These 
corrections themselves constitute nonroutine events with potentially disruptive effects not 
only for the financial system, but also for the real economy.  
IKE agrees with proponents of EMH – and by implication disagrees with at least 
some proponents of behavioral economics – that market participants act purposefully 
when they invest. However, they cannot know the future and cannot simply extrapolate it 
from the past; they can use existing information and knowledge to devise a strategy to 
follow until new information becomes available or events occur that demand change. 
This is the reason that traders and analysts are constantly hunting for new information 
and for clues to assess its relevance: it helps them to determine whether to stick to a 
strategy or abandon it. The prices generated in this fashion represent the relative value of 
different assets at a given moment in time. The asset value in turn influences a unit’s 
access to finance. 
In the aggregate, the purposeful behavior of all traders exhibits regularities. Yet, 
because of imperfect knowledge and nonroutine change these regularities can “become or 
cease to be relevant at times that cannot be fully specified in advance”.52 The tipping 
point occurs when enough traders begin to change the strategy they had devised earlier, if 
only cautiously. If and when followed by others, this change in direction can move asset 
prices market-wide – until a sufficient number of traders changes course again.  
These insights have led Frydman and Goldberg to dismantle the Rational Expectation 
Hypothesis (REH) and its cousin, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). REH states 
that the behavior of market participants “will ensure that asset prices reflect nearly 
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perfectly their mythical true longer-term values, thereby ensuring nearly perfect 
allocation of society’s capital”.53 They call the true long-term value “mythical” because it 
cannot be known to individuals or the “market”, or even to academic economists. Yet, for 
economists to derive consistent models (which has become the mantra of academic 
finance), the assumption that markets can be reliably forecasted is crucial. An important 
implication is that market participants “never revise their forecasting strategies in ways 
that they, or an economist’s Rational Expectation model, have not foreseen.”54 
EMH too is rejected as “castles in the air”.55  EMH asserts that prices reflect all 
(publicly) available information. An asset’s inherent or true value is derived from the net 
present value of its current and future investment projects. Calculating this value assumes 
that market participants know future prices and dividend changes56 – when in fact they do 
not and cannot know them.  
While for standard economics a rejection of REH and EMH amounts to depriving 
financial markets of their very purpose, IKE suggests, to the contrary, that if EMH held 
true there would be little reason for financial markets to exist. The very purpose of 
financial markets, their raison d’être, is the assessment of assets and the allocation of 
resources in a world of imperfect knowledge with non-routine change. Markets may not 
be perfect, but they “are the best institutions on offer”.57 In the words of Frydman and 
Goldberg, 
there is something fundamentally absurd about the Efficient Market Hypothesis. It 
is based on the idea that individuals are profit seeking, but it supposes that the 
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masses of market participants who do use available information in an effort to 
earn above-average returns are merely wasting their time.58 
 
As an alternative, Frydman and Goldberg propose the Contingent Market Hypothesis 
(CMH), which states that 
[T]he causal process underpinning price movements depends on available 
information, which includes observations concerning fundamental factors specific 
to each market. (....) This process cannot be adequately described by an 
overarching model, defined as a rule that exactly relates market outcomes to 
available information up to a fully predetermined random error at all time periods, 
past, present, and future.59 
 
As this definition suggests, CMH emphasizes the processes by which new 
information or events make their way into the pricing of assets. This is accomplished by a 
dynamic interplay of short-term speculative traders and long-term value investors. 
Speculators are concerned with short-term returns and base their trading decisions on 
“news about short-term trends”, but on “a wide array of fundamental factors”.60 Their 
time horizon hardly extends beyond the coming months or quarters and they focus on 
“clues about returns on companies’ shares”. 61  They include company-specific 
information, i.e. earnings, sales and costs, as well as information about the state of the 
economy, such as “future interest rates, inflation, and other fundamental factors that 
influence companies’ short-term prospects”.62  
In comparison, long-term “value” investors buy stocks that they believe are 
undervalued and hold them for an extensive period of time.63 They too cannot know how 
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the value of an asset will change over the time period they intend to hold it, no matter 
how many resources they put into background research. This is where speculative 
investors come in. Short-term investors respond to new information and events and 
thereby help track the “unfolding prospects of projects and companies”.64 The short-term 
trading activities help validate or falsify the bets long-term investors made by indicating 
how these bets might materialize. Speculators benefit value investors in other ways as 
well: They are the ones who buy their newly appreciated shares and thereby ensure that 
they can realize their value.  
Thus, far from turning an asset market into a casino,65 or endangering the stability of 
the system by introducing speculative elements as Minsky argued, according to Frydman 
and Goldberg short-term speculative investors play a valuable, if paradoxical, role in 
financial markets.  
The debate has largely failed to recognize that speculation is inherent to how 
financial markets perform their essential role in modern economies, which would 
imply the need to focus on harnessing speculation to improve capital allocation 
and curbing excesses that might cause a future crisis.66 
 
The need to curb excesses does not follow from some inability of markets to self-
correct. Frydman and Goldberg argue that they can and will do so eventually as more and 
more traders revise their trading strategy in light of new information, events, or in a 
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reflexive mode67 because others have done so. However, this self-correction may come 
too late. Traders are motivated by profits and as long as they observe information about 
fundamentals that supports the continuation of a bullish trend, they will continue to bid 
up the price of assets, even if they believe it to be excessive. They can do so because they 
do not internalize the “economic and social costs associated with such excesses”.68 This 
is where the state, law and regulation come in: “This externality, then, rationalizes a role 
for the state in asset markets beyond setting the rules of the game”.69   
In short, EMH and IKE are both concerned with the causes of disorder, where 
disorder is defined as the deviation of asset prices from some benchmark. 70 For EMH the 
benchmark is an idealized norm, such as a stable equilibrium outcome, or some intrinsic 
value (if only assumed). IKE rejects an idealized norm and offers as an alternative the 
empirically observable historical range of asset prices.  
An interesting question is how IKE and REMH relate to one another. Both theories 
reject the notion of “intrinsic” value and take a more pragmatic approach for analyzing 
and assessing market developments. For Gilson and Kraakman, EMH serves as a 
benchmark for assessing informational efficiency, whereas Frydman and Goldberg use 
historical data to determine extreme asset price swings. The two theories differ, however, 
in their take on financial stability vs. instability.  As discussed, Gilson and Kraakman do 
not explicitly address the question of stability, but they seem to assume that the more 
informationally efficient markets are, the more stable they ought to be. This explains their 
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regulatory approach, namely to further reduce information costs. In contrast, Frydman 
and Goldberg assume instability as an inherent feature of financial markets. Extreme 
asset price swings are not caused by a shortage of information, and informational 
remedies will therefore be ineffective. Instead, they are produced by endogenous 
processes that are associated with the decentralized valuation of assets in an ever-
changing world. The major purpose of regulation is to coordinate the correction of 
investment strategies before asset prices reach extreme levels. This will be further 
discussed infra under III. 
C. Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
 
Just as IKE, Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) starts from the notion of 
uncertainty. Minsky developed his theory on the basis of Keynes’s insight expressed in 
his “General Theory”71 that capitalism owes its existence, vibrancy, but also its tendency 
to destabilize, to a financial system. Capitalist economies not only trade, they also 
produce; more importantly, they invest. This makes a financial system indispensable, 
indeed foundational, for capitalism. For Minsky, uncertainty is part and parcel of every 
investment decision. The decision to invest involves a “supply function of investment, 
which depends upon labor costs and short-term interest rates, a demand function of 
investment, which is derived from the price of capital assets, and the anticipated structure 
and conditions of financing”.72  This implies that there is an “element of uncertainty in 
the decision to invest that has nothing to do with whether the investment will perform as 
the technologists indicated and whether the market for the product of the investment will 
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be strong. This element of uncertainty centers on the mix of internal and external 
financing that will be needed”.73    
Financing means the exchange of money now against commitments to pay in the 
future. Such commitments come in different forms, including notes, bonds, shares, 
deposits, and insurance policies. Some are short-term, others are long-term; some have a 
fixed time horizon, others an open time horizon. The list of financial instruments or 
capital assets is open-ended. Financial innovation, i.e. the creation of new financial 
instruments, is a hallmark of market based credit systems, in which individual market 
participants need to balance their own accounts, yet face the constant threat that one or 
more of its borrowers or counter parties might default. In good times close substitutes to 
cash relax the survival constraints of individual players. In bad times, however, all 
payment commitments and all financial instruments must be convertible into cash.74  
The main motivation for financial innovation, according to Minsky, is profit, which 
can be generated by managing capital assets. Capital assets are expected to yield income, 
or quasi-rents – i.e. the difference between the total revenue generated from selling 
output of current goods and the actual out-of-pocket costs for the production of such 
goods.75 Only when quasi-rents are realized within the expected time frame can the costs 
of financing and producing these goods be covered from income. Otherwise refinancing 
becomes necessary.  
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Minsky follows Keynes’s argument that in the process of financing investments and 
taking positions on capital assets, money is created.76  As long as bankers and firms 
believe, based on information available to them, that the investments or quasi-rents 
derived from capital assets will finance the payments due on debt, they will be inclined to 
make funds available for new investments or for refinancing, and in the process they 
produce more money. Conversely, when their views change, finance will be cut back. At 
the aggregate level, these actions result in an increase or decrease in the supply of money 
– i.e. in claims that are, in principle, convertible into cash.  
The fact that the act of financing produces money has important implications for the 
functioning of the pricing system for capital assets. In Minsky’s view, the basic static 
model with intersecting supply-demand curves used to explain the pricing system for 
current goods misses core features for the pricing of capital assets. Neither can pricing of 
capital assets be reduced to the allocation of resources (as assumed by proponents of 
EMH) or the distribution of income. Rather, “in a capitalist economy resource allocation 
and price determination are integrated with the financing of outputs, positions in capital 
assets, and the validating of liabilities”.77 In other words, the cost of financing affects 
asset prices. 
The structure of financial commitments and the types of cash flow used to meet 
obligations as they become due are critical for determining the relative stability of an 
economic system. Minsky argues that there are essentially three types of cash flow: 
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income, balance sheet, and portfolio.78 Income cash flow results from the process of 
production and includes wages and salaries, payments for intermediate and final goods, 
and gross profits after taxes. Balance sheet cash flows are used to meet existing liabilities, 
both principal and interest.79  Lastly, portfolio cash flows result from financial assets 
changing hands: The buying or selling of assets and the issuance of new liabilities 
generates portfolio cash flows.  
How individual “units” (households, firms, municipalities, the government) and the 
economy as a whole prioritize among these different forms of cash flows to meet their 
obligations determines the degree of a system’s financial (in)stability. A stable economy 
is one in which most entities use income cash flows most of the time to meet payment 
commitments on the outstanding liabilities. Minsky calls this “hedge financing”. When 
the balance sheet cash flows are larger than the expected receipts from income, the unit 
will have to engage in speculative or even Ponzi finance. Speculative finance describes a 
situation where borrowing becomes necessary to meet current obligations, but it is 
expected that future cash receipts will cover cash payments. Speculative finance morphs 
into Ponzi finance when it is expected that future obligations can be met only by raising 
new capital.  
Every financing scheme is vulnerable to the possibility that the Liquidity Constraint 
turns out to be less elastic at the time when payments need to be made than was presumed 
at the ex ante stage. This follows from imperfect knowledge. However, Minsky 
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emphasizes that the degree of instability varies for different forms of financing. Hedge 
financing is vulnerable “only” to miscalculations about the amount of actual receipts 
coming in at a future date – i.e. to changes in the performance of the firm or the overall 
trajectory of economic development. In contrast, speculative and Ponzi financing are also 
vulnerable to the more volatile developments of financial markets.80 This is an important 
difference to IKE, which (as discussed) does not address the Liquidity Constraint.  
While financing strategies are essentially a matter of choice and can be influenced by 
appropriate institutional design, the tendency to destabilize is inherent to any financial 
system in a capitalist economy. In a system in which hedge financing dominates, 
introducing speculative elements, i.e. offering short-term finance at higher interest rates, 
can create a competitive advantage.81 This in turn increases the demand for and thus the 
value of assets and leads to capital gains. Where capital gains are earned today and are 
expected in the future, speculative finance is more readily available as capital gains are 
expected to cover any difference between the liabilities and future income. When 
economic conditions allow for the repeated rollover of debt, competitive pressures ensure 
that more and more units shift to speculative finance. Thus, “profit opportunities within a 
robust financial structure make the shift from robustness to fragility an endogenous 
phenomenon”.82 The contrast to EMH could not be more clearly stated. Whereas EMH 
supposes that markets will approach equilibrium outcomes, the FIH predicts the opposite: 
Markets will trend towards instability. Absent proactive intervention this can lead to 
major financial and economic crises. 
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Once individual units are no longer able to refinance their debt and, as a result, 
expectations based on past experience that debt obligations will be met in the future are 
no longer validated, the amount of liquidity in the financial system decreases. Banks and 
other financial intermediaries will cut back on lending and refinancing as their own 
survival constraint forces their hand. A series decline in liquidity triggers a major 
downward adjustment of asset prices throughout the economy, which can turn into an 
economic recession or depression. Transposed into the conceptual world of IKE this 
implies that liquidity shortage triggers swings in asset prices.83 
To avoid this outcome, central banks typically offer lender of last resort facilities: 
They signal that they stand ready to buy or accept as collateral any assets that are no 
longer marketable.84 In essence, the Fed refinances the debt private entities have incurred; 
in doing so it provides liquidity to the system. Following Keynes, Minsky argues that this 
is precisely what central banks should do.85  Such an intervention, however, does not 
come without costs. Not only do taxpayers have to stand in for the losses, the intervention 
creates moral hazard problems as market actors begin to rely on future bailouts. Minsky’s 
answer to this problem is not to refrain from bailouts. Instead he suggests that the 
adequate response is regulatory reforms that address the causes of instability.86  
The central bank virtually assures that there will be another crisis in the near 
future unless, of course, it outlaws the fragility inducing financial practices. 
Clearly, central bank lender-of-last-resort interventions must lead to legislated or 
administered changes that favor hedge finance.87 
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Mirroring the structure of financial systems at the time of his writing, Minsky devotes 
most of his attention to banks, the “central financial organization of a capitalist 
economy”.88 This may no longer be accurate in today’s market-based credit system. Still, 
Minsky defines banks very broadly: Any entity that creates and markets financial 
instruments, not only to those entities, which, because of some legal convention, are 
labeled “banks”. The distinction between banks and thrift institutions, different types of 
money managers or investment banks, and so forth, can be attributed to historical 
accidents. Their codification into a typology of regulated financial entities may stand in 
the way of an adaptive response to a changing economic environment.89 The focus of 
regulation, therefore, should not be a specific entity, but any moneymaking activities that 
may destabilize the system. Minsky details his policy recommendation in the final part of 
his book, where he calls for comprehensive reform of institutions that include not only 
banks and other financial intermediaries, but the competitive structure of the economy, 
the tax system and the corporate sector.90 
D. The Money View of Finance  
 
 
Minsky’s theory was largely ignored by modern financial economics.91 The primary 
reason was that he built on an intellectual tradition that was increasingly regarded as 
outmoded; one that drew on central bank practices and learning in the earlier parts of the 
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20th century.92 Mehrling himself builds on that very same tradition, which he has labeled 
the “money view” to differentiate it from the “finance” and the “economic” view. As 
defined by him, the “finance view” focuses on the valuation of assets as is the case for 
EMH. The “economic view” focuses on social welfare, in particular on how investments 
made by past generations affect the prospects of the present generation. This is the 
domain carved out for macroeconomics, which traditionally has been distinct from 
finance.93 In contrast, the “money view” focuses on the operation of the complex money 
system that links households and firms to brokers and dealers, and these intermediaries to 
the entities capable of producing high-powered money – i.e. to the monetary authorities. 
(B)oth economics and finance abstract from money; for both of them, money is 
just the plumbing behind the walls, taken for granted. Both largely ignore the 
sophisticated mechanism that operates to channel cash flows wherever they 
emerge, to meet cash commitments wherever they are most pressing. As a 
consequence, neither the economics view nor the finance view has been 
particularly well suited for understanding the crisis we have just been through, a 
crisis during which the crucial monetary plumbing broke down, almost bringing 
the rest of the system down with it.94 
 
It follows that to understand the financial crisis the plumbing behind the walls must 
be brought into daylight, analyzed, and understood. The basic building blocks of the 
money system are shiftability, the central role of dealers, the function of arbitrage, and 
the role of a backstopper to the system: A lender or even a dealer of last resort. In the 
following each of these elements will be discussed in turn. 
Shiftability means the ability to sell on demand an asset for cash to meet one’s 
obligations. The ability to shift assets in order to raise cash has been a core feature of the 
American banking system long before the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. 
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Whereas in England banks would fund their liquidity needs by raising short-term 
commercial loans (bills of exchange) that were “self-liquidating”, in the US the highly 
volatile agricultural sector created strong seasonal fluctuations in the demand for credit 
and the ability to convert claims into cash on demand.95 US banks met that demand for 
liquidity primarily by lines of credits with other banks; when that source of liquidity dried 
up, they used high quality bonds in their portfolio as collateral for loans, or sold them on 
the market.  
Such shiftability depended ultimately on security dealers and other speculators 
being willing to buy the assets that banks wanted to sell, and so-called speculative 
credit was always the lifeblood of the dealer business. Thus, paradoxically, it was 
speculative credit, not productive credit, as the source of liquidity for most 
American banks in the years before the Fed.96 
 
The framers of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act were well aware of these practices. 
According to Mehrling, they recognized and at the same time sought to create outer 
bounds for shiftability by declaring that the Fed would only discount commercial loans, 
i.e. that only these loans were shiftable to the Fed as the ultimate provider of cash.97 Yet, 
the Act did not rule out any of the practices (investing in different asset classes and using 
one to make up for shortcomings in another) that facilitated shiftability. The implication 
was that assets that were not shiftable to the Fed remained shiftable in private markets. 
They were useable in private markets and facilitated the expansion of credits. As 
Mehrling put it, “private credit elasticity is always a substitute for public credit 
elasticity”.98 The stock market crash in 1929 laid barren the stark difference between 
private and public shiftability. When shiftability in private market ceased, i.e. when 
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sellers no longer found buyers for the papers, liquidity dried up, converting a problem of 
illiquidity into one of insolvency. Yet, the Fed stuck to the principle of discounting only 
commercial loans. It therefore stood on the sidelines as the complex system of privately 
provided market liquidity went into reverse, bringing with it an economy-wide 
depression.99 
Dealers, the second institutional pillar in contemporary financial markets according to 
the MVF, are an indispensable feature for shiftability. Unlike brokers, dealers take assets 
and the credit risk associated with them onto their own books. For this service they 
charge a premium, and they make profits on the difference between this premium and the 
discount rate the Fed will charge them should they need to shift assets to the Fed for 
liquidity purposes. The framers of the original Federal Reserve Act believed that the 
system would be self-enforcing: By clearly drawing a line between shiftable and non-
shiftable assets, it was hoped that the law would induce market participants to internalize 
the costs of non-shiftability at the upper end of the chain. Yet, the profit opportunities 
associated with shiftability proved too tempting.100 To see this, consider how a dealers 
market operates. 
A dealer takes assets on her own book. She quotes bid and ask spreads to others with 
a view of balancing her own risk and profitability. She finances the positions in these 
assets by raising funds in another market, in our own days typically the repurchase or 
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Repo market,101 using the assets as collateral. By carefully managing the term structure 
arbitrage of her portfolio, the dealer can make a profit. As long as the dealer has access to 
the repo market, to bank loans as a kind of lender of last resort for dealers,102 or to the 
Fed, the risk inherent in dealership can be mitigated. If and when these sources of 
liquidity dry up, the system unravels. To fully appreciate the critical role of dealers in a 
world with the Liquidity Constraint, it is useful to contrast it with a hypothetical world 
without it. This is how Mehrling describes such a world:  
Then, so long as the expected profit on the term structure was positive, dealers 
would have an incentive to increase leverage, buying bonds and selling bills. 
Competition among dealers would drive expected profit on the term structure 
arbitrage to zero, and the expectations hypothesis would come into its own. (…) 
[I]t is a world in which there is no survival constraint, hence no liquidity risk, 
hence no liquidity premium in asset prices. It is a world without dealers.103 
 
This is not the world we live in. Nor can such a world be explained in terms of 
informational asymmetries; that may work for brokers who are pure intermediaries, but 
not for dealers who take the risk of the underlying asset, including the liquidity risk, onto 
their own balance sheet. The Fed, in turn, lubricates the private dealer system by 
participating directly in the repo market for Treasuries. 104  Since dealers and other market 
participants use Treasuries as collateral, these interventions directly affect liquidity, and 
hence prices, in other asset markets as well.  
                                                        
101
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Two things follow. First, money and capital markets are deeply intertwined; 105 
primary dealers with direct access to the Fed are critical links in this system. And second, 
according to the money view of finance (MVF), liquidity is a critical determined of asset 
prices.106  
Shiftability can be enhanced by creating new tradable assets. This is the essence of 
financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage. Recall Samuelson’s famous dictum that 
efficient capital markets are characterized by “no arbitrage”.107 In contrast, MVF can be 
interpreted to suggest that in a world governed by the Liquidity Constraint arbitrage is a 
defining feature, and the major purpose of financial innovation is to create new arbitrage 
opportunities in order to enhance liquidity elasticity. 
Take the example of the currency swap. It was designed to circumvent capital 
controls under the Bretton Woods system. The currency swap allowed firms to gain 
access to foreign capital by swapping loan obligations in different currencies so that 
technically no capital crossed borders.108 It is only a step from here for a bank with 
branches in both countries to offer firms from these markets a dealer service for a fee by 
accepting the default risk of either party in the transaction. Further, the bank may want to 
hedge its risk by entering into a forward market with yet another bank. The only reason 
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 The interdependence of money and capital markets has deep historical roots. In order to meet higher 
demand for credit during agricultural sowing periods, banks would build reserves during low demand 
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this other bank will be willing to engage in such a transaction is that it expects to make a 
profit, which it does if and when “the forward exchange rate is greater than the realized 
spot exchange rate”.109  Modern finance theory holds that it should not be possible to 
make money on these transactions, because under equilibrium conditions the return from 
two different investment strategies should be identical.110 Yet, in reality counterparties in 
swap transactions do make money because they carry “the risk involved in absorbing 
mismatch in the currency swap market”.111 This is essentially a liquidity risk, which 
markets price, but which modern finance theory simply ignores. 
The currency swap is only one in a whole series of financial innovations for the 
purpose of regulatory arbitrage. Another example is Regulation Q, which stipulated an 
interest rate ceiling savings and loans associations could pay on their deposit liabilities.112 
The strategy around this restriction was to design a new financial vehicle to which this 
restriction would not apply and to make money by attracting more deposits. According to 
Mehrling, this was “the origin of the money market mutual fund”.113 Another important 
invention has been the credit default swap, which allows the separation of interest rate 
risk, default risk, and the risk of devaluation of the underlying asset. Specifically, the 
issuer of CDS assumes the default risk and makes a profit from the differential between 
the insurance premium he charges and the expected costs for delivering cash or risk-free 
assets in the event of default. These deals are structured as implicit rather than explicit 
loans to avoid triggering reserve and capital adequacy rules.  
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As such, swaps provided a neutral way to get around regulations designed for 
traditional bank balance sheets, regulations that typically scaled both required 
reserves and required capital to the size of the balance sheet. Here is the origin for 
the so-called shadow banking system.114  
  
The most important source of stability for a financial system built on shiftability and 
dealers is the availability of a lender or even dealer of last resort, i.e. an agent willing and 
able to offer cash for assets that are no longer shiftable in private markets. Because it is 
the ultimate guarantor of liquidity, the LLR sits at the core of a system of interdependent 
financial claims. “[I]n effect, the central bank realizes the survival constraint by 
providing current cash flow to allow borrowers to delay the day of reckoning”.115 Prior to 
the global crisis, the Fed had developed the practice to “always lends freely”, but “only to 
primary security dealers, only against Treasury security collateral, and only at the 
Treasury repo rate that corresponds to the target Fed Funds rate”.116 The hope that by 
limiting shiftability to the Fed markets would internalize the risks they took by creating 
private sources of shiftability proved to be mistaken yet again. In the aftermath of the fall 
of Lehman Brothers private credit contraction was sufficiently severe for the Fed to 
expand the range of parties it was willing to lend to and the type of collateral it was 
willing to accept and put on its own balance sheet.  
The result was, first, a hollowing out of the Fed’s balance sheet as it sold off its 
Treasury securities (to the former lenders) to fund new loans (to the former 
borrowers), and an explosion of the Fed’s balance sheet as it expanded its deposit 
liabilities (to the former lenders), and used the proceeds to fund additional lending 
(to the former borrowers).117 
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The Fed adapted its response to the crisis to the market structure that had evolved 
under its stewardship. In the new world of a capital-market-based credit system,118 where 
even commercial banks have morphed from lenders into dealers, the central bank itself 
became a Dealer of Last Resort (DLR).  
In effect, the Bagehot principle can be understood as recommending that the 
central bank post a wide bid-ask spread in the money market and use its balance 
sheet to absorb the resulting flow of orders. This is more or less exactly what the 
Fed did in the various emergency liquidity facilities that it opened in response to 
the crisis.119 
 
This outcome was far from inevitable. Rather, Mehrling attributes it to the thinking of 
monetary policy makers in the years leading up to the global crisis. Specifically, the 
dominance of EMH in financial economics and the dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model in macroeconomics furthered policies aimed at producing the 
very equilibrium outcomes theoretical models predicted, but markets were not producing 
on their own.  
Monetary policy came to be seen as a matter of making liquidity in the real world 
the free good that it was in ideal theory. The result was a systematic bias toward 
ease by the monetary authorities, systematic bias that private speculators were 
only too happy to exploit for private profit. In effect, the monetary authorities 
became partners with the private speculators in a quixotic drive to make EH as 
true in reality as it was in theory.120 
 
This intellectual framework ensured that policy makers ignored asset prices.  After 
all, markets were believed to set the “natural” interest rate plus some expected inflation. 
Price stability, not financial stability, was the overriding concern, and for that the index 
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of consumer prices was deemed sufficient.121 According to Mehrling, this policy stand 
has proved disastrous: “[I]f the Fed fails to raise interest rates in the face of a credit-
fueled asset price bubble, the bubble will feed on itself, growing ever larger and having 
ever greater distorting effects, until it bursts”.122 To see why, recall how the dealer system 
operates. The cheaper it is to fund liquidity for dealers with access to the Fed lending 
facilities, the greater their incentives to leverage themselves and offer cheap market 
liquidity to private borrowers. This is the mechanism through which low (Fed) funding 
rates translate into high asset prices. The effects were (predictably from MVF) 
particularly pronounced for fairly illiquid assets not supported by a two-way dealer 
system, such as home loans.   
To summarize, MVF can be described as a further development of Minsky’s FIH 
and its adaptation to 21st century finance. Banks are no longer the central agents in 
finance, markets are; in this new market-based credit system dealers take center stage as 
liquidity providers. Having allowed this system to evolve to the breaking point, the Fed 
had no option but to evolve from (only) a lender into a dealer of last resort. In short, 
Mehrling attributes the crisis in large parts to governance failures and these failures to an 
intellectual climate that favored the finance view over an institutionally founded money 
view of the financial system. 
III. Financial Theories and Regulatory Implications 
 
 
How we think about financial markets determines how we regulate them. It should 
therefore not be surprising that the different theories lead to different regulatory 
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strategies. Table 1 below summarizes how the four theories introduced above depict 
financial markets and the regulatory implications they draw.  
 
Table 1: Comparing Theories and their Regulatory Implications 
 
 (R)EMH IKE FIH MVF 
Function of 
financial 
markets 
Resource 
allocation 
Resource 
allocation under 
conditions of 
uncertainty 
Resource allocation 
under conditions of 
uncertainty and 
illiquidity 
Management of 
illiquidity risk in 
interconnected dealer 
market 
Pricing in 
financial 
markets 
EMH: Pricing of 
intrinsic value; 
REMH 
information costs 
implies relative, 
not absolute 
efficiency 
Pricing under 
conditions of 
uncertainty can 
create extreme 
asset price 
swings  
Pricing integrated 
with the financing 
of outputs, 
positions in capital 
assets, and the 
validating of 
existing liabilities 
Pricing influenced by 
liquidity; expansion 
and/or shift in liquidity 
creates asset price 
booms; reversals in 
liquidity trigger collapse 
of asset prices 
Regulatory 
Implications 
Improve (relative) 
information 
efficiency  
Guidance range 
and excess 
dampening to 
prevent extreme 
asset price 
swings  
Reform economic 
institutions to 
promote hedge 
financing 
Manage system-wide 
money supply by 
monitoring asset prices 
 
A. Comparing Financial Theories 
 
The different conceptions of financial markets are reflected in the function they are 
deemed to serve (Row 1). EMH and IKE see the primary purpose of financial markets in 
the allocation of scarce resources to productive use. However, IKE points out that 
resource allocation may be suboptimal because it takes place under conditions of 
imperfect knowledge. FIH agrees, but pushes the argument a step further: Pricing in 
financial markets is determined not only by uncertainty or imperfections in our ability to 
forecast the future, but also by the Liquidity Constraint. Because it is impossibility to 
convert all claims into cash at any given moment, markets operate under the Damocles 
Sword of a reversal in liquidity. MVF shares this position. Examining the complex 
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market-based credit system that characterizes finance today, it suggests that liquidity 
drives both upswings and downturns in asset prices: When extra liquidity becomes 
available because liquidity is shifted from one market to another or a new class of 
tradable assets is created, asset prices go up. When liquidity dries up, financial 
intermediaries can be forced to conduct a fire sale of assets to meet their own obligations, 
thereby triggering a collapse in prices. 123 In a world of highly interconnected two-way 
dealer markets, the main function of financial markets is the for-profit management of 
liquidity. 
It follows that the four theories have different perspectives on how financial assets are 
priced and how the pricing affects the market’s stability. For EMH the pricing 
mechanism is at the heart of its efficiency postulate. In its strong form, EMH postulates 
that prices incorporate all relevant information and thus lead to the efficient allocation of 
resources – a state where no transaction is possible that would make one party better off 
without making another party worse off. When information is not costless, a fully 
efficient outcome cannot be achieved; nonetheless, by managing information costs, 
relative efficiency is deemed achievable.124  
According to IKE prices that are created in this fashion can experience abrupt swings 
with dire consequences for the financial markets and the economy as a whole. The reason 
is that investment decisions are not only impeded by information costs; they are affected 
by fundamental uncertainty about what the future holds. This implies that corrections in 
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asset prices may become necessary. This is why markets are inherently instable; and the 
larger the correction the more dire the consequences.  
FIH and MVF agree that changes in the future are likely, but these changes are not 
triggered by updates to our knowledge alone. Instead, they are directly linked to the 
availability of liquidity. Minsky argues that the pricing mechanism in financial markets is 
fundamentally different from the pricing mechanism for ordinary goods. 125  It is 
determined not simply by the demand and supply for that good, but also by the 
availability of liquidity. If positions in capital assets can be easily refinanced today, 
financing for new investments is more easily available than if past claims become 
invalidated by a history of default. As Mehrling points out, in a world of market-based 
credit systems based on the constant shiftability of assets, liquidity becomes a primary 
driver of asset prices. Every entity in this system is constantly seeking to balance its own 
balance sheet, taking positions often financed with debt, thus relying on funding liquidity, 
and liquidating others to generate instant cash, taking advantage of market liquidity under 
the threat of its own survival: The ability to meet obligations as they become due. As 
long as there are enough takers for existing assets they can be converted into cash upon 
demand. If that is no longer feasible, markets and prices collapse. 
On the way up, ample funding liquidity in private money markets supported the 
extension of market liquidity into previously unchartered territory, and that 
extension supported collateral valuations that supported further extension of 
funding liquidity. On the way down, the same reinforcing cycle worked in 
reverse. This is the inherent instability of credit, twenty-first century edition.126 
 
The regulatory implications follow directly from these theories. For EMH and its 
close cousin, REMH, it is all about information costs; for IKE it is managing the 
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imperfect knowledge constraint. In contrast, Minsky advocates a wholesale 
transformation of economic institutions to more stable financial structures, and correcting 
deviations from them, which are to be expected given the inherent drive of markets 
towards instability. Mehrling takes a less radical view on regulation. He does not 
advocate comprehensive institutional reforms, but governance mechanisms that are 
attuned to the Liquidity Constraint.  
B. Towards a New Approach to Financial Regulation  
 
The regulatory strategies that follow from REMH are straightforward and sufficiently 
familiar so that they will not be further elaborated here. 127  The critical issue is 
information costs and a fear that over-regulation might foreclose arbitrage opportunities 
and other strategies market actors use to deal with informational frictions. In contrast, 
from the perspective of FIH, the event of a crisis suggests the need for far-reaching 
institutional reforms that should encompass not only the financial system, but the entire 
economic system.128 Finance and the economy at large are viewed as deeply intertwined. 
They therefore need to be reformed in tandem to ensure that a more stable system 
emerges in the aftermath of a crisis. Such a far-reaching reform agenda has rarely been 
realized as the political obstacles are significant. A partial exception is the New Deal in 
the US – although Minsky criticizes even these reforms as being beholden mostly to pre-
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Keynesian thinking and insufficiently attuned to the inherent instability of finance.129 As 
Minsky himself realized, an important reason for the lack of impetus for comprehensive 
reforms that might render a more stable system is the role the central bank has come to 
play during crises. Its interventions mitigate the effects of the crisis, thereby undermining 
the political resolve for the kind of corrections that would be needed to stabilize the 
unstable economy. The legislative answer to the financial crisis in the US, the Dodd-
Frank Act, confirms this. It seeks to offer greater protection for consumers and introduces 
macro-prudential risk management, but leaves the financial and economic system as it 
existed prior to the crisis largely intact.130 
Approaches to regulation that move beyond EMH, yet do not call for the 
comprehensive institutional overhaul Minsky proposed, can be found in the two 
remaining theories, IKE and MVF. The subsequent analysis will focus on them rather 
than FIH for two reasons to explore whether there is a middle ground between 
overhauling the structure of our financial and economic system on one hand, and 
pretending that except for some information problems all is well in the world of finance.  
IKE and MVF both suggest that effective governance of financial markets requires 
substantially more than reducing information costs. They require proactive regulatory 
strategies to prevent crises. Both theories view modern economies and financial systems 
as highly dynamic and suggest that markets rapidly adapt to new regulation. As a result, 
predetermined static modes of regulation will by outdated soon after being enacted. Both 
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theories therefore call for governance regimes that give substantial discretion to 
regulators. This raises important questions about who governs these governors.131 We 
will return to this question infra under 3. First, we need to clarify the regulatory 
implications that follow from IKE and MVF respectively, and where and why they might 
differ from one another. To do so, the following two subsections pitch the two theories 
against one another. IKEs’ approach to regulation is summarized first, but interspersed 
with reactions that follow from the logic of MVF. Roles are switched in subsection 2 and 
MVF takes the lead as IKE responds. 
1. IKE’s Regulatory Approach 
 
 
For IKE, the major objective of regulation is to address the problem of instability that 
results from imperfect knowledge and nonroutine change. Frydman and Goldberg do not 
believe that government agents are better equipped at making allocative decisions than 
markets. Nor do they think that they have superior information or knowledge. They 
certainly do not suggest that government agents should substitute for markets. Instead, 
the purpose of regulation is to manage an inherently instable system, which because of 
this inherent instability should not be presumed to allocate resources well.132 This should 
be done by way of “guidance range” and/or “excess dampening” measures.133 
Guidance range is meant to signal to the market that it has well exceeded historical 
benchmarks in asset price movements. While the computation of these benchmarks is 
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contestable, the use of data offers some check on the discretion of regulators. 134 
Policymakers should monitor asset price development and announce publicly and with 
reasons given when the market overshoots significantly.135 The primary purpose of this 
announcement is not to add additional information: According to Frydman and Goldberg, 
most market participants today are well-informed and will realize when price swings 
have reached extremes.136 Instead it “may help coordinate their [i.e. market participants’] 
views around official assessments in much the same way that the inflation targets set by 
central banks do for inflation expectations”.137  
From the perspective of MVF these measures are useful in that they ensure that 
regulators will actually monitor asset prices. However, they are likely to be insufficient. 
As long as liquidity remains highly elastic, i.e. as long as market participants find dealers 
willing to shift their assets for a reasonable liquidity premium, they will continue to bid 
up asset prices irrespective of any guidance range announcements. Moreover, those with 
access to liquidity even after an asset price swing has occurred – specifically, those with 
direct access to the Fed funding facilities or to investors with big pockets, like Sovereign 
Wealth Funds or Warren Buffet – are less likely to respond to such guidance range 
because they operate under a different survival constraint. Yet, they are the ones with 
potentially the biggest impact on asset prices.  
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In fact, from the MVF perspective guidance range may be the least effective where it 
is most needed. Excess liquidity tends to have the least impact on highly liquid markets 
and the most on those that are illiquid.138 During boom times new credit facilities and 
rising asset prices attract dealers to new markets. By offering two-way dealer services 
they foster greater liquidity of assets that have hitherto been largely illiquid. An example 
is the market for securitized mortgages to finance housing. When liquidity dries up and 
the bubble bursts these markets are often the first markets to fail.139 Critically, these new 
markets may be too young to offer long-term historical data for purposes of guidance 
range.  
In addition to guidance range, IKE proposes a more proactive governance strategy, 
namely the dampening of excessive price swings. This suggests that Frydman and 
Goldberg are well aware that guidance range alone might be insufficient. A specific 
policy recommendation associated with excess dampening is counter-cyclical capital 
requirements. They recommend that these measures should be stratified to ensure that 
financial intermediaries with strong exposure to particular markets, such as housing, are 
required to take additional safeguards.140 
MVF does not oppose capital requirements, but from its perspective one would 
caution against relying on them too heavily. First, they guard primarily against default, 
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not illiquidity;141 and while illiquidity may lead to default, it need not do so, at least not if 
short-term illiquidity problems can be effectively addressed. Moreover, past experience 
suggests that their efficacy is often undermined by regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, the 
evolution of financial markets and the pace of financial innovation suggests that attempts 
to constrain credit growth by imposing capital or reserve requirements can push market 
participants to find ways to formally comply while making sure that their disposable 
assets are in fact not much curtailed. Swaps, CDS and other instruments have been used 
for these purposes; indeed some have suggested that the primary function of CDS has 
been regulatory arbitrage.142 One implication is that capital adequacy rules may have 
been ineffective; even more problematic, additional sources of liquidity risk were created 
in response to capital adequacy requirements. Critically, these risks remained largely 
unrecognized by financial intermediaries and regulators alike. 
Monetary policy is another policy tool that could be used as an excess-dampening 
measure.143 One such tool is interest rates, but Frydman and Goldberg caution that they 
may be effective in influencing asset prices only in the short term. More tribute is given 
to the Fed’s innovative quantitative easing policies during the crisis, which, according to 
Frydman and Goldberg, affected interest rates more directly and with longer lasting 
effect.144 For Mehrling, the interventions by the Fed are not so much about interest rates. 
Indeed, he questions whether interest rates are the mechanism by which monetary 
policies affect asset prices:  
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Monetary policy works, in the first instance, by affecting the behavior of dealers 
not banks, and by pushing around asset prices not bank lending. Maybe eventually 
the lending mechanism kicks in, but on a time scale much longer than the daily 
survival constraint that is at the center of a money view perspective.145 
 
Instead, he argues that when the Fed eases funding conditions it directly affects the 
behavior of primary dealers. They will change the prices they quote on Treasury bills and 
bonds to manage their own order flows. In doing so they affect others in the system, who 
in turn will adapt their price quotes. The dealer system transmits changes in liquidity at 
the top throughout the system. As a result, the prices of “corporate bonds, mortgage-
backed securities, even foreign securities146 are directly affected by the Fed’s intervention 
in the Treasury market. In a similar vein, MVF views the innovative interventions by the 
Fed during the crisis not so much as measures to affect long-term interest rates, but as 
actions of a dealer – the dealer of last resort.147 By effectively insuring assets that were no 
longer sellable in the market the Fed supported the price of other assets that also 
depended on liquidity.148 
In addition to guidance range and excess dampening, IKE offers a new take on rating 
agencies. Much attention has been paid to the possibility that collusion between rating 
agencies and banks whose products (such as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs) 
they assess may bias the rating.149 While such collusion cannot be ruled out entirely, IKE 
suggests an alternative explanation for why rating agencies have been so frequently so far 
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off the mark.150 Given the pervasiveness of imperfect knowledge and nonroutine change, 
rating agencies too are affected. Their ratings are based on assumptions that are informed 
by current knowledge, which, as we have seen, may turn out to be wrong in light of 
actual developments. To ensure that investors don’t blindly follow ratings but are 
reminded of their inherent imperfection, Frydman and Goldberg argue that they should 
not only disclose their assumptions, but offer at least two sets of ratings: One that is 
based on one set of assumptions, and another based on modified assumptions.151 This 
would enable individual traders to assess which of the ratings is closer to their own 
perception of the world. It would thus play a similar coordinative role as the guidance 
range announcements of the central bank discussed above.  
Rating agencies do not feature prominently in MVF. The theory is about the 
plumbing of the financial system, the ebbs and flows of liquidity and the central role of 
dealers at the chutes of the system. A possible shortcoming is that this underestimates 
how factors other than the supply of credit might affect liquidity. An argument could be 
made that credit rating agencies contributed to making liquidity more elastic by 
furthering the appearance that assets, such as securitized mortgages or CDOs, were safe 
for investment. This allowed pension funds and other investors to acquire such assets and 
enhanced their shiftability.  
Where rating agencies enter MVF, at least indirectly, is where most of the action 
takes place according to this theory, namely on the balance sheet of financial 
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intermediaries. Mehrling points out that both the shadow banking system and the 
investment bank dealer system “were net buyers of AAA protection”152 for the upper 
tranches of CDOs in their portfolio. This implies that rating agencies had a role in 
designating the tranches these agents were selling or holding. Yet, for MVF the critical 
question is not the rating as such, but the counterparty question. Since assets on the 
balance sheet of one party must find a mirror image on the liability side of another, the 
critical question becomes, if most players in the financial system were buying protection 
for AAA tranches, who was selling?153  
As it turned out, these were traditional bond insurers, such as MBIA, Ambac and the 
Financial Products Division of AIG. Their own risk models suggested that the probability 
of default for AAA rated papers was extremely unlikely and that, therefore, they could 
charge an insurance premium essentially for nothing. The problem in this calculation was 
not primarily that they miscalculated risk (although they did that too), but that they 
misunderstood their role and that of CDS in the financial system. 
And yet, their willingness to provide AAA protection was completely essential to 
the system; without it, dealers would not have been able to square up their CDS 
books and, hence, would not have been able to provide the market liquidity on 
which the entire system depended. The insurers were getting money for 
something, but without realizing what that something was.154 
 
In essence, they were insuring for liquidity, whereas their models had only 
contemplated default. This misconception is arguably not addressed by IKE’s proposal to 
require rating agencies to issue several ratings based on different assumptions. A possible 
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strategy to reconcile the two views would be to require rating agencies to rate not only 
default, but also liquidity risk. 
2. MVF’s Regulatory Approach 
 
MVF’s approach to regulation is still in the early stages of development and not as 
specific as that of IKE. Still, several principles of regulation emerge from this theory. 
MVF eschews the distinction between finance and money as well as between micro and 
macro that is so deeply engrained in conventional thinking about the financial system. 
For MVF they are not separable, neither in good nor in bad times. They belong to the 
same plumbing system and feed directly into each other. This is why the Fed’s monetarist 
policy, which calibrated money supply to reflect an ideal demand for liquidity, had such 
far-reaching and ultimately disastrous consequences for the financial system. According 
to Mehrling, Monetary Walrasianism motivated the Fed to supply “liquidity as a free 
good” in the hope that this would induce markets to approximate equilibrium 
outcomes.155 At the same time as the Fed focused on controlling the money supply, it 
gave private markets free range in the supply of credit without acknowledging the 
interdependence between the two. “Thus, the natural thrust toward fragility was 
amplified, not dampened, by the operations of the financial authority”.156  
According to MVF, any attempt to reform the governance of finance must therefore 
start with the Fed. The crisis has forced it into the role of DLR and future reforms must 
start from here. “We are not going to start from scratch, so our reforms had better engage 
with the system as it is, not as it was or as we might wish it to be in some ideal world”.157 
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Yet, to adequately respond to the system as it has evolved, a profound retooling of the 
Fed’s conceptual framework is required to avoid embarking on another “quixotic” 
venture that will contribute to rather than prevent the destabilization of financial 
markets.158  Specifically, according to MVF, the Fed should continuously monitor all 
asset prices and tailor its policies and direct market interventions to the dynamics of 
liquidity these data reflect. The need to monitor all asset prices follows from the fact that 
it is impossible to determine ex ante when and for which asset classes a liquidity crunch 
will occur. 159  This can be interpreted as a nod towards IKE, but with emphasis on 
monitoring liquidity. 
Moreover, the Fed should oversee both funding and market liquidity.160  Funding 
liquidity refers to the ability of private dealers to “borrow in the money market in order to 
finance their market-making operations in capital markets”.161 The monitoring of funding 
liquidity should extend to Repo as well as Eurodollar markets, because the Fed is the de 
facto dealer of last resort for these markets. The need to monitor market liquidity follows 
from the recognition during the crisis that interventions aimed at guaranteeing funding 
liquidity on its own did not ensure market liquidity.162 In the diagnosis provided by MVF, 
private dealers translate funding liquidity in money markets into market liquidity by 
borrowing in money markets to finance their positions. Effective monitoring must keep 
an eye on both sides of this equation – funding liquidity and market liquidity.163 
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MVF does not suggest that the Fed should substitute for private actors – except in 
extreme cases, as in wartime or major financial crises. Specifically, even though money 
markets and capital markets may be intertwined, the Fed should not set the price for 
capital market products. Instead, it should set a floor for them, “which in normal times 
should be some distance away from the market price”.164 Neither is it the role of the Fed 
to eliminate the risk dealers face. The most important function the Fed should perform is 
to signal to markets that – contrary to the Fed’s past policies – liquidity is not a free good. 
This would help “establish an arena within which private calculation of expected profit 
and risk makes sense”.165  
From the vantage point of IKE, these recommendations are not much different from 
“guidance range” or “excess dampening”. The price floor for securities could be 
characterized as MVF’s version of IKE’s guidance range; and the establishment of 
“bounds” for market participants within which they make their decisions about how to 
allocate resources is MVF’s version of “excess dampening”. Note, however, that the 
purpose of the monitoring and governance efforts differs in the two accounts. Whereas 
IKE is concerned with managing imperfect knowledge, MVF regards liquidity as the 
overriding policy concern. IKE therefore places much (though not exclusive) emphasis 
on incentives to push away from the brink, whereas MVF stresses the need to directly 
affect the hydraulics of the money system, i.e. the ups and downs of liquidity. 
Nonetheless, the similarities between the two approaches suggest that the same regulatory 
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regime might serve both goals. Moreover, as the previous discussion has suggested, the 
two approaches are not mutually exclusive. It may therefore be useful to pursue both.  
 
C. Reforming Governance vs. Reforming Finance 
 
This section explores in greater detail what impact the insights derived from IKE and 
MVF would have for the governance of finance. We lump the two accounts together in 
this final analysis, because there is sufficient overlap in the regulatory implications 
between them. As the constructed dialogue between IKE and MVF in the previous 
section suggests, the proponents of both IKE and MVF maintain that regulating the 
financial systems they describe is feasible and both put a lot of weight on the central bank 
as the chief regulator. Neither, however, offers a full blown account of how an effective 
regulatory regime would look like that would be true to the challenges they describe 
while also being compatible with basic principles of self-ordering in democratic polities.  
Governing an unstable financial system under conditions of imperfect knowledge and 
illiquidity raises difficult questions about the proper design of governance regimes.166 
The major objective for such a regime would have to be to guard against financial 
instability while promoting innovation and financial expansion. This would be a 
significant departure from the current regulatory paradigm, which emphasizes the 
market’s inherent move towards equilibrium and associates virtually any innovation in 
financial markets as well as market expansion with efficiency. Such a new regulatory 
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paradigm would also require regulators to be more responsive to an ever-changing 
environment. It would require them to have the wherewithal to spot these changes and 
grant them sufficient flexibility to respond to new challenges as they arise.  In short, it 
would require a highly competent, independent, and yet socially responsible super-
regulator. 
1. Responsiveness    
 
IKE and MVF both emphasize the need for regulatory flexibility and discretion. In a 
world of imperfect knowledge neither market participants nor regulators know what the 
future will hold. It therefore makes little sense for lawmakers or regulators to devise 
highly specified rules to incentivize market actors so that they might achieve optimal 
outcomes. In that sense, both laws and regulations are incomplete.167 Regulators may 
have somewhat greater flexibility in redesigning and adapting rules over time than do 
legislatures because regulatory change does not require the same broad political support 
as does legislation. Nonetheless, a regulatory philosophy that seeks to optimize rules ex 
ante will always lag behind market development.168 Not only will it be ineffective should 
circumstances change; it also offers a convenient focal point for regulatory arbitrage. The 
more specific a regulatory regime, the more attractive it becomes for regulatory arbitrage 
and the less equipped it is to respond to such market behavior.169 
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Similarly, from the perspective of MVF it is difficult to determine ex ante where and 
when liquidity problems will occur in the future. In competitive financial markets entities 
are bound to search for or develop new asset classes that can be held or traded for profit. 
Illiquid assets can be made more liquid by attracting two-way dealers that offer liquidity 
risk management services, and new financial assets can be derived from others. This 
makes it difficult to foresee which asset class will be targeted in the future and which 
entities will serve as dealers or offer insurance services. Mehrling therefore argues that 
regulators should monitor “all” assets 170-- a tall order given the pace and scope of 
innovation in today’s financial market place.  
Taking Imperfect Knowledge and the Liquidity Constraint seriously implies the need 
to move from a regulatory framework that emphasizes rule optimization to one that 
focuses on processes for managing markets as they evolve, i.e. to monitor them, adapt 
existing strategies, and devise and implement new regulatory measures as need be to 
ensure that the market is stabilized before it reaches another pivot point.171 But who 
should exercise such power? Is it possible for a single actor to monitor all assets 
effectively? How much discretion should it have to intervene and what tools of regulation 
should be at its disposal?  
Both theories place the central bank, in the US the Fed, at the center of attention. It 
occupies the core of the financial system172 because it is the only entity with unlimited 
access to high-powered money. According to Mehrling, the existence of a liquidity 
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provider of last resort makes the money system inherently hierarchical. It seems only 
natural to endow the Fed with the regulatory tools to make the most of its position.173 In 
IKE’s account, the Fed also plays a critical role. It sets interest rates and engages in 
quantitative easing. And, although not specified as the agency that should adopt guidance 
range announcements, it would be a natural candidate for this role. 
2. Who Governs the Governor(s)? 
 
 
The empowerment of the central bank as the primary governance agent for financial 
markets raises fundamental questions of accountability and democratic governance. The 
Central Bank gets to decide in a looming crisis when and where to intervene, to select 
whom to lend to or what assets to accept as dealer of last resort. In essence, in extreme 
situations it decides over the life and death of individual entities and the system as a 
whole. That is a lot of discretion.174 Even if experts on central banks assure us that central 
bankers are professionals and devoted to doing the right thing,175 some accountability 
will be needed not only to guard against the temptation of abuse, but to ensure that there 
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is some level of political responsibility if Central Bank actions fail to achieve the desired 
outcomes or have adverse effects. 
One approach might be to require more public justification for Central Bank actions. 
IKE suggests that regulatory interventions, such as guidance range announcements, shall 
be reasoned and that the analysis that motivates the intervention is disclosed.176 This is an 
important step in the right direction – provided the political system works effectively –
but it may not be sufficient. The Central Bank will, of course, always justify its 
interventions by arguing that they were necessary to save “the system” from collapse. 
Putting aside concerns about bias or capture of such a powerful regulator, that 
justification sounds hollow: There will always be a range of options to choose from. The 
act of choosing when associated with the allocation of costs and benefits that these 
choices entail makes this in essence a political decision.177 At least in democracies such 
decisions should be ultimately accountable to the electorate – unless in finance we face 
“the fateful choice between effectiveness and fidelity to the principle of self-rule”.178 If 
only a central bank can save the financial system from collapse, one might argue, then 
perhaps it should be given all necessary powers to do so.179  But this will not come 
without costs. The problem of delegating this much power to a central agent is 
compounded by the fact that traditional means for holding agencies accountable, such as 
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predetermining the objectives if not the means of regulation are unlikely to work. This 
approach presumes that the objectives of the regime can be determined ex ante and that, 
therefore, governing is primarily about implementing these objectives, not their 
articulation. Yet, in a rapidly changing world these objectives are unknown and the lines 
between goal determination and implementation are blurring.180  
Furthermore, some theorists have suggested that empowering a single agent at the 
core of the system may be counter-productive under conditions of uncertainty. 
Comparing the pros and cons of different forms of organization, Qian et al. suggest that 
the traditional hierarchical U-Form of firm organization works best when outcomes are 
known ex ante. If, however, outcomes are unknown, unpredictable, or if a firm seeks to 
discover new products or markets, the more flexible multi-functional M-Form is superior, 
as it encourages experimentation and cross-divisional learning.181  The equivalent of this 
approach in terms of regulatory architecture would be to have multiple regulatory 
agencies that coordinate horizontally with each other, not only through a central 
authority. This would give every regulator the requisite flexibility to respond to events as 
they emerge and facilitate communication and responsiveness of multiple agencies. 
This is, of course, not the way most regulatory agencies are structured today. Most 
are independent from direct political interference and autonomous from one another, and 
they carefully guard their turf. In some countries they have been integrated into a single 
regulator, but that has re-enforced hierarchy not a coordinated, flexible response 
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systems.182 The reforms that were introduced following the financial crisis also bear the 
hallmark of hierarchy, not horizontal coordination. The US still stands out in international 
comparison as a regulatory regime with many, perhaps too many, regulatory agencies. 
Still, the trend even here has been to centralize monitoring and regulation. Specifically, 
the Dodd-Frank Act183  established the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), 
which comprises of the Fed, the Treasury and other key regulators.184 The FSOC shall 
“identify risks to the financial stability of the United States”, “promote market 
discipline”, and “respond to emergency threats”. 185  It must rely on other regulatory 
agencies to perform this task, but the point is that all critical information shall be 
channeled through FSOC and that it has ultimate authority for determining when it is 
time to act and how. 
This centralized approach is not inconsistent with IKE’s or MVF’s approaches to 
regulation. But these theories may well be underestimating the ability of a central agent 
to collect and process all relevant information. They also must find answers to the 
challenge coming from organizational theories that under conditions of uncertainty 
hierarchy may not be a suitable governance solution. This raises the question, whether 
there are viable alternatives, specifically solutions that encourage decentralized and 
discretionary law enforcement, yet are compatible with democratic oversight.  
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A possible solution may come from the literature on “New” or “Experimental 
Governance”.186 It holds that multi-level governance structures without a firm command 
center and clearly defined lines of control are feasible, in fact hat they encourage 
stakeholder participation in the making and enforcement of governance regimes. 187 
Critically, however, experimental governance presumes the willingness of all 
stakeholders to cooperate in the search for new governance solutions. This requires that 
they recognize that the objectives and means of governance are not known to any of 
them. It also assumes that stakeholders have a mutual interest in finding workable 
solutions, which is a prerequisite for their willingness to deliberate and experiment in the 
search for solutions.188  
Unfortunately, the world of finance is not a place where awareness of one’s own 
limitations or worldviews is very pronounced. Rather, it is characterized by groupthink 
and by intellectual silos that are reinforced by organizational practices.189 Few market 
participants, officials at the Fed or the Treasury, ar academics in the relevant fields saw 
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the crisis coming; 190 those who did were derided for their deviation from the shared 
exuberance about a new dawn in the management of financial risk.191 Moreover, attempts 
to incorporate modes of experimental governance into financial regulation have failed 
spectacularly in the global crisis, at least in part because both regulators and the regulated 
were caught in the same belief system. 192  Basel II, the revised Basel Accord to 
standardize financial regulation internationally, was lauded for incorporating such 
innovative practices in the regulation of banks.193 It allowed banks to opt out of rigid 
capital requirements established by Basel I,194 provided they could demonstrate to their 
regulators that they have in place effective internal risk management models and systems 
for their review. Famously, Northern Rock – the first English bank to experience a classic 
bank run since 1866 – received approval from the UK Financial Services Authority under 
Basel II to use its own internal risk assessment model only weeks before the bank 
collapsed.195 As Simon suggests, the risk management models banks used and regulators 
approved 
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were impaired by misunderstandings shared by both banks and regulators, 
including the assumptions that returns would be “normally” distributed and that 
reliable assessments of volatility could be based on data from short periods.196  
 
Add to this the fact that financial intermediaries can benefit from extending their own 
liquidity lifeline by developing new financial instruments and shifting assets to others at 
the expense of the stability of the overall system, it becomes obvious that cooperative 
experimentation may not be the right approach to regulating finance.  
 
3. Too complex to govern? 
 
If centralized financial governance by unaccountable agents is incompatible with 
principles of democratic self-governance; moreover, if hierarchy is unlikely to deliver on 
the promise of efficacy given the rapid evolution of finance and the fundamental 
uncertainty market actors and regulators face; and if, finally, innovative forms of 
governance under the heading of new or experimental governance do not offer a viable 
alternative, the logical conclusion is that financial markets have become ungovernable. 
Were financial markets self-regulating and capable of naturally achieving efficient 
outcomes, as EMH and related theories would have it, we need not worry. The empirical 
evidence of repeat and severe crises in financial markets, however, seems to corroborate 
Minsky’s insight that markets trend towards instability not stability. This would suggest 
that we need a different reform agenda. Instead of trying to govern the ungovernable we 
should instead focus on restructuring finance to ensure that it is compatible with our 
ability to govern and the normative principles we wish to be governed by.  
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IV. Concluding Comments 
 
The financial system is critical for market-based, capitalist economies. According to 
Keynes, it is the defining feature of these systems.197 Yet, modern financial economics 
and its equivalents in legal academia – law and economics and law and finance – have 
little to say about how financial markets operate, how they are structured, why markets 
that were deemed efficient could collapse in short order, and what implications any of 
this might have for the governance of financial markets.198 The black letter law that is 
taught in law schools is inevitably the codification of past views on finance and financial 
practices that may no longer be up to date at the time it is taught or practiced by recent 
law graduates.199 The high level of technical sophistication needed to master these areas 
of law tends to obscure the dis-connect between law on the books, the theories that may 
have informed this law, and the actual operation of the financial system.  
Lawyers do, however, play a critical role in the world of finance. They help structure 
new instruments, advise market participants on the legality of their actions and devise 
strategies for them to minimize the costs of regulatory restrictions. Lawyers also serve as 
expert witnesses to Congress and work in committees or at regulatory agencies that are 
charged with developing new legislation or regulations. This requires that lawyers know 
something about how markets operate in the real world. Fortunately, there are literatures 
that offer insights into this. The major objective of this essay has been to introduce these 
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literatures to a broader legal audience. It has drawn on older theories, such as Minsky’s 
FIH and implicitly on Keynes,200 but also on more recent theoretical advances that build 
on them. The most critical factors in these alternative theories are Imperfect Knowledge 
and the Liquidity Constraint, and the interaction between the two. They help explain why 
markets tend to destabilize even under assumptions of actor rationality and ready access 
to relevant information. These theories therefore hold important clues for rethinking not 
only the governance of finance but the organization of the financial system itself. They 
remain underdeveloped with regards to their regulatory implications and arguably are 
over-optimistic about the feasibility of the few solutions they do advocate. This essay has 
highlighted some of these deficiencies and pointed to the logical conclusion these 
deficiencies imply: our inability to govern finance may be best addressed by changing the 
structure of financial markets, not to attempt the impossible. 
The analysis presented here can and should be only the beginning of a more 
comprehensive debate about what kind of financial system we want to have. This essay 
hopes to make a modest contribution to such a debate; most importantly, it urges that it is 
too early to close the books on the crisis and critiques of the models that have failed to 
predict or explain it, and to proceed as if nothing has changed. It remains an open and 
pressing question whether the reforms that have been enacted offer any protection against 
similar events in the future. Of course, time will tell. Yet, we gamble on the ability of 
markets to generate equilibrium outcomes at our peril. As Minsky put it eloquently: 
In an era when performance failures demonstrate the need for economic reform, 
any successful program of change must be rooted in an understanding of how 
economic processes function within the existing institutions. (…) A theory that 
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denies what is happening can happen (…) offers no useful guide to a solution of 
the problem.201 
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 Minsky (1986), supra note 10 at 3 and 5. 
